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Using the previously shared Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs, a proposal
which can be used to distribute a quantum key and identify the user’s iden-
tification simultaneously is presented. In this scheme, two local unitary op-
erations and the Bell state measurement are used. Combined with quantum
memories, a cryptographic network is proposed. One advantage is no classical
communication is needed, which make the scheme more secure. The secure
analysis of this scheme is shown.
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I. INTRODUCATION
Perfectly secure communication between two parties can be achieved if they share be-
forehand a common random sequence of bits (a key), so how to distribute a secret key is
very important for secure communication. In classical cryptography, there is nothing to pre-
vent an eavesdropper from monitoring the key distribution channel passively without being
caught by the legitimate users. In quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD)
[1] has been proposed as a new solution to this problem. QKD is a technique that permits
two parties, who share no secret information initially, to establish a shared secret sequence
of bits, its security is based on quantum law, such as “no-cloning” theorem. Since the pub-
lication of the BB84 protocol [1], QKD has developed into a well-understood application of
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quantum mechanics to cryptography. Many theoretical schemes have been proposed [2-5]
and many experiments have been done [6-10].
Typically, QKD schemes depend either on an unjammable classical communication chan-
nel or on authentication of the classical communication by classical methods. Generally, the
assumption that the classical communication channel is unjammable seems unpractical, so
the key authentication is very important for the security. Recently, several quantum authen-
tication (QA) schemes [11-16] have been proposed. Dusek et al [11] presented a proposal
based on the combination of classical identification procedure and QKD. In the proposals
[12,13], the parties initially share entanglement. Another kind of proposal is based on en-
tanglement catalyst [14,15]. In these schemes, either unjammable classical communication
is needed [11-15], or legal users previously share a sequence of secret bits [11, 13]. In this
paper, we present a scheme, by which, QKD and QA can be realized simultaneously. In this
scheme, some Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pairs are previously shared by two parties,
called Alice and Bob. When they want to establish a sequence of secret keys, any party,
for example Bob, sends his particles back to Alice after he does one of two local unitary
operations I and σx randomly, where I =


1 0
0 1

 , σx =


0 1
1 0

 . After having received par-
ticles from Bob, Alice makes a Bell state measurement on two particles belong in original
EPR pair. By this way, Alice and Bob can share a sequence of keys, at the same time,
Alice and Bob can identify the identification of each other. In this scheme, only previously
shared EPR pairs are needed. During the QKD and QA, compared to other schemes, no
classical communication and previously shared secret bits are needed if the quantum channel
is error-free. Furthermore, this scheme can be used to transmit information directly because
of no discarded bits during the transmission in the case of the error-free channel.
If this scheme is combined with the quantum memories [17], QKD between any pair of
parties can be realized. No classical communication is needed in the network in the case of
error-free channel.
In section II, we present a new two-party quantum cryptographic scheme, which can be
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realize simultaneously QKD and QA. In section III, we present a quantum network based on
this scheme with the addition of quantum memories. In section IV, we give a brief discussion
and conclusion.
II. A TWO-PARTY QKD AND QA SCHEME
Suppose that Alice and Bob have previously shared K pairs entangled states in
Ψ− =
1√
2
[|01〉 − |10〉], (1)
where the first particle is held by Alice and the second particle is held by Bob. QKD and
QA in this scheme consist of the following steps.
1. Bob performs randomly one of two local unitary operations I and σx on his particle
in each EPR pair.
2. Bob sends his particle back to Alice.
3. After having received this particle, Alice does a Bell state measurement on the particle
from Bob and the particle from herself, these two particle initially belong in the same EPR
pair Ψ− .
If Bob performs the unitary operation I on the particle belong in him, the state Ψ−
holds unchanged. If the unitary operation performed by Bob is σx, the state Ψ
− will be
transformed into state Φ−, where Φ− = 1√
2
[|00〉 − |11〉], which is another Bell state. The
other two Bell states are Ψ+ = 1√
2
[|01〉 + |10〉] and Φ+ = 1√
2
[|00〉 + |11〉] respectively. So
when Alice does a Bell state measurement, she should only get the result of state Φ− or Ψ−
if no eavesdropper exists.
4. After having completed transmission, Alice and Bob let state Ψ− and the unitary
operation I correspond to binary “0”, the state Φ− and the unitary operation σx correspond
to binary “1”, then they can share a key, at the same time, identification of Bob is authen-
ticated. In order to identify Alice, this scheme needs a small revision. We let Bob send a
certain number of particles back to Alice, alternatively, let Alice send next certain number
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of particles back to Bob. Of course, Alice also does one of two unitary operations I or σx
on the particle belong in her before she sends the particle back to Bob. Bob does the same
measurement to identify Alice. The number is decided before transmission by Alice and
Bob, and it is public to everyone, not secret. By this way, we can realize the QKD and QA
simultaneously.
Obviously, no classical communication and no previously shared bits are needed in this
scheme, which may make our scheme more secure. Furthermore, no discarded bits makes
this scheme transmit the information directly in the case of error-free channel.
Now, we discuss the security of our scheme. Firstly, we analyze the intercept/resend
strategy. When Alice or Bob sends particle back to each other, an eavesdropper Eve may
intercept this particle and resend a fake particle instead according to her measurement result.
For example, when Bob sends his particle back to Alice, Eve intercepts it . Because the
state of particle belong in Bob is
ρB = TrAρΨ− = TrAρΦ− =
1
2
{|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|}, (2)
Eve can not get any information by this way. If Eve resends a fake particle to Alice, for
example, this fake particle is in the state φE = c |0〉 + d |1〉 , where, |c|2 + |d|2 = 1.When
Alice receives this particle, she does a Bell state measurement on this fake particle and the
particle belong in herself. The state of the fake particle and the particle of Alice’s is
ρAE =
1
2
{|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|} ⊗ {c2 |0〉 〈0|+ cd∗ |0〉 〈1|+ c∗d |1〉 〈0|+ d2 |1〉 〈1|}. (3)
If Alice does a Bell state measurement on these two particles, she will get any one of four
Bell states with equal probability 1/4. If Alice gets the result state Ψ+ or Φ+, she can
conclude that eavesdropper exists.
Now, we discuss another strategy. Suppose when Bob sends his particle back to Alice, Eve
performs a CONTROLLED-NOT (CNOT) operation . The control particle is the particle
from Bob, the target is an ancillary particle |0〉E owned by Eve. If the control particle is |0〉,
the target particle holds unchanged. If the control particle is |1〉, the target particle flips.
After CNOT operation, the state of three particle is
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Ψ−AB ⊗ |0〉E CNOT→
1√
2
[|011〉 − |100〉]ABE (4)
or
Φ−AB ⊗ |0〉E CNOT→
1√
2
[|000〉 − |111〉]ABE . (5)
Then Eve holds the ancillary particle and let the particle from Bob to pass to Alice.
After having received the particle from Bob, Alice does the Bell state measurement . If
Bob makes I unitary on his particle, then Alice can get the state Ψ− or the state Ψ+ with
the probability 50% respectively. As we knows, no result Ψ+ can be got if no eavesdropper
exists. If Bob makes the unitary operation σx on his particle, then Alice will get the result
Φ− or Φ+ with the probability 1/2 respectively. The result Φ+ should not appear if no
eavesdropper exists. So, if Eve uses this strategy, she can not get any information at all and
legal users will detect her.
Can Eve learn any information from the ancillary particle? the answer is no. Whether
the unitary operation is I or σx, the state of the ancillary particle is the same, which is
ρA=
1
2
{|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈1|}, so Eve can not get any information from the ancillary particle.
According to the above analysis, our scheme is secure if the error-free channel is used.
III. A QUANTUM NETWORK BASED ON THIS SCHEME WITH THE
ADDITION OF QUANTUM MEMORIES
In this section, we combine the two-party QKD scheme with the use of quantum memories
to present a quantum cryptographic network. Our scheme is similar to the scheme of Ref.
[17], in which a quantum file owned by the center is needed. Of course, some differences
exist between these two schemes. Our scheme can be summaried as the follows:
1. In the preparation step the user prepares L pairs EPR states Ψ− and sends one particle
of each EPR pair to the center, holds the other particle of each EPR pair by himself. The
center keeps these particles in a quantum file without measuring them.
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2. When users Alice and Bob wish to obtain a common secure key, they ask the center
to create correlation between two strings, one of Alice and one of Bob. The center perform
the Bell state measurement on each pair of qubit, which realize the entanglement swapping.
After that, Alice and Bob share a EPR pair. What the Bell state will be obtained depends
on the result of the Bell state measurement performed by the center. For example, if the
Bell state measurement result performed by the center is Ψ− , the Bell state shared by Alice
and Bob is Ψ− too. Then Alice and Bob can realize the QKD with the previous scheme in
section II. The table I summaries the results obtained by the center, state shared by Alice
and Bob, the unitary operations and Bell state measurement performed by Alice or Bob,
corresponding binary number.
Table I
center state Alice and Bob state unitary operation Bell state measurement binary number
Ψ− Ψ− I or σx Ψ
− or Φ− 0 or 1
Ψ+ Ψ+ I or σx Ψ
+ or Φ+ 0 or 1
Φ− Φ− I or iσy Φ
− or Ψ+ 0 or 1
Φ+ Φ+ I or iσy Φ
+ or Ψ− 0 or 1
The reason that when state shared by Alice and Bob is Φ+ or Φ− , the unitary operation
is iσy instead of σx will be shown in the following.
3. An honest center, which perform the correct entanglement swapping does not get any
information on the strings.
4. If a cheating center ( or any eavesdropper who might have had access to the quantum
files), who modifies the allowed sates, unavoidably introduces error between the two strings.
The analysis about this case is similar to Ref. [17]. There is another case, in which the
center does not tell the correct Bell state measurement result, for example, he tells Alice
and Bob that the result is Φ+ instead of correct result Ψ+. In this case, if the unitary
operation I or σx is used to distribute QKD, the strategy of the center will be successful,
because Ψ+
I→ Ψ+, Ψ+ σx→ Φ+, Φ+ I→ Φ+,Φ+ σx→ Ψ+. Obviously, if the center uses this
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strategy, then Alice and Bob can not detect him and will share a reversed binary number.
In order to resolve this problem, we use the unitary operator iσy instead of σx. If the center
is so careless that he make a Bell measurement on the pair consisted of particle from Alice
and particle from other user, not from Bob, by this scheme, this mistake can be detected
by Alice and Bob. Because Alice and Bob do not share the EPR pair, when Alice or Bob
does a Bell state measurement on their particle, the result which should not appear will
be obtained with certain probability. There is another complicated strategy, in which, the
center let unlegal user named Charley as a legal user Bob, and make Alice and Charley share
EPR pairs instead of Alice and Bob. Besides, the center let Charley as legal user Alice and
make Charley and Bob share another EPR pairs. When Alice (Bob) sends back her (his)
particles to Bob (Alice), Charley can intercept them and make a Bell state measurement,
then resends his particles back to Bob (Alice) according to his result of the measurement.
Obviously, our scheme is useless to this kind of strategy. This means the authentication in
the network depends mainly on the center.
IV. DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
A two-party scheme can distribute a key and identify the user’s identification simulta-
neously.. One advantage of this scheme is only previously shared EPR pairs are needed, no
classical communication and previously shared classical secret key are needed. Besides, this
scheme can be used to transmit the information directly in the case of error-free channel.
Based on this scheme with the addition of the quantum memories, a network similar to the
scheme of Ref. [17] can be realized. Contrast to the Ref. [17], no classical communication
is needed. Besides, no qubit is discarded in the case of error-free channel. One of another
advantage is no information is included in EPR pair before QKD. One disadvantage is quan-
tum channel is needed, and any user needs to keep quantum state, which make this scheme
complicated. Our scheme seems like a public-key cryptsystem. The unitary operations can
be regraded as public key and the secret key is EPR correlation. One problem is how to
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distribute EPR pairs, one possible way is present in Ref. [18]. In practice, one disadvantage
of our scheme is how to realize a completely Bell state measurement. Very recently, Kim et
al [19] proposed a scheme which can solve this problem. Another disadvantage is the storage
of the EPR pair , which is also serious problem in quantum computer. Now, it is already
possible to keep the quantum state in the spin of the ions for more than 10 Min. [20]and
in principle it is possible to keep them for years. So, Our scheme may be implementable in
practice.
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